Greg Detre
Monday, 08 January, 2001
note C:\WINDOWS\Desktop\sussex philosophy\ethics\Ethics Lecture 8 � Moral Facts.htm
Kant�s moral law is a �categorical imperative�. It is discoverable a priori, i.e. through reason without reference to experience or the senses, as opposed to a posteriori, i.e. the senses, experience or empirical facts. An imperative is more than just a command, but a �command of reason�, so that if we were governed by reason alone we would infallibly abide by it. By �categorical�, he means that it is good in itself, as opposed to �hypothetical� imperatives which are merely good because they are means towards something. It might be argued that something can only be rational as a means to a desired end. In answer, we could say that though this may be true of hypothetical imperatives, a categorical imperative is, by definition, rational in its own right.
So act that you treat humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other human being, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end. � Groundwork, 428
These are the ends that are also duties:
one�s own perfection
happiness of others
These cannot be inverted to become �the perfection of others� and �my own happiness� for they are done of their own accord, as opposed to �duty� which is a �necessitation to an unwillingly adopted end�. When promoting other people�s happiness, they may choose ends which are not permitted, because they infringe others� freedom or conflict with their ends.
Every action is right if it or its maxim allows each person�s freedom of choice to coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law � M, 230-1, Universal principle of right
Thus, actions can be morally indifferent � neither required nor forbidden. �Fanciful virtue� is when one becomes overly concerned with dutifully performing such morally indifferent acts.
The only source of value is moral law. Only a good will is, without qualification, good � not through its actions, but through its willing. The highest good consists in an overall unity of virtue and happiness.
Kant�s method, he says, is to start with ordinary people�s jumble of beliefs and try to abstract to the supreme underlying principle (analytic), then use it to work back towards the problems affecting our lives (synthetic).
Morality is prescriptive (unlike hypothetical imperatives).
It is impossibly to conceive of a moral requirement without recognising that
that is what one ought to do
and that there is no rational, moral reason for not doing it. Moral
requirements are categorical imperatives � they are automatically reasons for
action, even though I may of course choose not to act even so. It is in this
sense that it is a moral �law�, rather than that it can be neatly codified.
Three propositions
detail the moral as the source of value and guide for conduct:
The only thing that can give an action moral worth is acting out of a
sense of duty. Acting out of inclination may be in accordance with duty but if
it is not out of duty, it has no moral worth. A properly virtuous person is one
in whom there is a �firmly grounded disposition to fulfil one�s duty exactly�.
Freedom of will is autonomously choosing to act as though according to a
universal law.
It is not the effects of an action, but the intention (the maxim being
acted upon) that determine its moral character.
�Duty is the necessity of acting out of respect for the law� �
Groundwork, 400. By necessity, he does not mean that we are automata, but that
we recognise that if we want to be moral we must obey the moral law.
�Respect� and �interest� are confusing ideas which may be connected with feelings, but boil down to a willingness to accept the primacy of the moral law and act accordingly.
Kant has difficulty with whether or not his practical laws can work in the same way as theoretical principles. They are objective and prescriptive � he believes that we can know a conclusion is entailed by premises yet refuse to actively draw it in the same way that we are free to fail to act on a moral law even though we know about it.
However, Hume and Quine would seek to undermine the a priori altogether, which Kant�s account could not survive. Kant did not believe initially that Hume could possibly be so radical an empiricist as to deny all a priori knowledge, including, for example, maths. His answer to Hume�s attack on our notions of causality rests on our need for some foundational principles in order to be able to interpret experience at all, principles that cannot themselves derive from experience. After all, Kant says, such empiricists would not be able to argue rationally about these things at all if no a priori tenets are allowed.
Moral law must also be universal: �I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim become a universal law�.
As for those who act wrongly out of a misguided sense of duty, their actions have no moral worth even though they might seem to. In his example of an inquisitor trying a heretic, Kant says that the inquisitor has allowed his feelings to invade his moral judgement, i.e. his conscience, and that he needs to reflect and listen to the voice of reason.
Walker develops finer points on the above. The categorical imperative stipulates that one should act as though one�s action become a �universal law of nature�, a stronger claim that applies universally to all occasions and rational beings � moreover, it is not merely saying that it be a maxim that anyone can follow, but one that everyone can follow. O�Neill�s example of a maxim to buy but not sell is batted aside by adding the caveat �� provided that others want to sell them�.
Four casuistical questions are discussed � that of a lying promise, Frederick the Great�s preparation to suicide rather than be ransomed, allowing one�s talents to rust in the pursuit of enjoyment and paying no attention to the needs of others. In each case, Kant endorses the traditional moral standpoint.
There is an important qualification that is easily missed about Kant�s technical use of the term �will� to mean practical reason, i.e. wants as constrained by rationality (�Willk�rather than merely a desire for something, which may be good or evil (�Wille�). He also adds the principle of autonomy, which is subtly different???
The Kingdom of ends is a utopia of harmonised ends and dutiful good for the perfection and happiness of all.
Kant addresses the problem of freedom in a causally deterministic world in an interesting way. Because freedom is critical for moral responsibility, and the motivation/intentions of an act determine its moral value, Kant needs to consider how there can be morality if we are all effectively automata. His answer refers back to his Critique of Practical Reason and the distinction he makes there between the world of appearances (phenomena) which we inhabit in time and space, and the world as it is in itself (nuomena) which is intelligible really only to God. He seems to be saying that although we appear to be automata in the world of appearances, our underlying moral freedom is encoded in the rationality of the timeless underlying reality. He regards this metaphysics as the bedrock below which we may not delve in our philosophy of morality, and bids us act as though we are free and in these circumstances his system will work.
How does reason lead one so indubitably to these conclusions? Is there a logical progression leading from premises to his moral law as formulated?
No. Walker portrays Kant as believing that one can investigate no deeper and they must be taken as given.
I don�t understand how a person can be kind and nice without failing to be sufficiently dutiful and moral.